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ABSTRACT: Different ideas about the ‘nature’ of science communication and its role in society inform different 
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1. INTRODUCTION: BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND CROSS-CULTURAL EXCHANGES 
The task of articulating ethical issues that arise from science communication is accompanied 
by the equally demanding task of comprehending and articulating different understandings of 
the “nature” of science communication and its role in society. Because such understandings 
relate to what is taken for granted, they are not normally articulated. They rest on basic, tacit 
assumptions—ideas—about the order of things. Those ideas, in turn, somehow inform ideals 
and norms concerning what should be considered ethical challenges and what ought to be 
done. Idea(l)s or logics of that kind tend to vary from culture to culture. The scrutiny of basic 
assumptions, therefore, is crucial to any international and, thus, cross-cultural endeavour to 
discuss and articulate ethical issues. If the level of basic assumptions is ignored, exchanges 
across logics are likely to become muddled. 
 The following tentative comparative analysis of two science communication logics, 
both of which relate specifically to science journalism, should be seen against that background. 
It is an attempt to sketch and compare two distinct and genuinely different science 
communication idea(l)s—here dubbed the tradition of science transmission and the logic of 
science discussion—which are predicated on different basic assumptions and deliver different 
answers to questions such as: Why science communication? By whom? To whom? When? 
How? 
 Particular attention is paid to how the two logics differ from each other. They are 
presented as schematized versions of real-life phenomena, examples of how science 
communication idea(l)s may differ. 
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 The overall aim of this comparative exercise is to facilitate the identification of 
disagreement proper and of possibilities for mutual learning between two of the many possible 
science communication idea(l)s. 
2. COMPARING APPLES AND ORANGES: BACKGROUND AND APPROACH 
Science journalism is merely one aspect of the wider field of science communication, so it 
should be kept in mind that the analysis below focuses on science journalism alone. The 
analysis pivots on different understandings of the mores and means of science journalism. 
More often than not, however, those mores and means can be seen as expressions of general 
understandings of the mores and means of science communication in general. 
 It is suggested that the decisive differences between the two science journalism idea(l)s 
can be summed up as follows: The tradition of science transmission is the dominant idea(l). It 
takes the primacy of science for granted. Science is taken to constitute the epitome of reason 
and knowledge of reality. The logic of science discussion, on the other hand, takes the primacy 
of public discussion for granted. Science is taken to represent varieties of reason and 
knowledge of reality that must be dealt with, when relevant to public affairs, as part of a wider 
societal practice of reasoning. As a consequence, the former logic expects journalists to serve 
science, while the latter expects journalists to approach science guided by a general norm of 
independent, journalistic inquiry. The former comes with an idea of science journalism, the 
latter with an idea of science journalism. 
 The two idea(l)s can be seen as representatives of Atlantic and northern European 
approaches (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), respectively, or as representatives of scientific and 
classical humanist approaches (Merton, 1968)—or even as expressions of politico-cultural 
differences between language areas (Meyer & Lund, 2008). Thus, the relationship between the 
two is characterised by a good many conflicts, but should not, however, be viewed as 
dichotomic. Rather, the two logics are genuinely different, and the comparison can, indeed, be 
seen as a comparison between apples and oranges. It makes sense to explore the differences. 
Crucial among those are the different normative roles ascribed to scientists, journalists and 
other citizens with respect to science communication. 
 The point of analytic departure has been ongoing efforts to identify, characterize and 
compare two distinct traditions of journalism: the Anglo-American Reporter Tradition and the 
north- and central-European Tradition of Publizist1 Journalism (Meyer & Lund, in press). 
Those efforts, in turn, have been prompted by practical experience with journalism on science- 
and technology-related issues, followed by academic inquiry (Meyer, 2005) into the 
journalism-science relationship. 
 Furthermore, the analysis draws on the reading and comparison of examples from 
different points in time; from, on the one hand, British and, on the other hand, German and 
Swedish discourses about science communication. Some British and German examples have 
been drawn from the gene therapy debates of the early 1990s (Appleyard, 1996; Durant, 1995; 
McKernan, 1995; McLaren, 1994; Monbiot, 1995; Thurau, 1994). In both countries, the public 
image of science was debated and related to financial problems in science. How was it 
                                                
1 The (German) spelling with a “z”—Publizist—has been chosen to prevent confusion with the notion of a 
“publicist” as a PR or marketing agent and to stress the meaning of participation in public debate. Although 
the latter meaning of a “publicist” does, indeed, occur in American texts (see for instance Jacoby, 2000; 
Stearns, 1921/2012), the former interpretation seems to be dominant. 
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debated? What was taken for granted, and what challenges were recognised? Could related 
assumptions and patterns be identified in recent material from, respectively, British (BBC 
Trust, 2011, 2012; Morgan 2012) and Swedish (Björkstén, 2012) documents about science 
journalism? 
 The topic is anything but exact, and the analytic approach is explorative. Consequently, 
the analysis is meant only to suggest. The two idea(l)s are presented as schemata which are 
open to revision. They are academic models. As such, however, they might prove useful as 
starting points for further inquiry, reflection and exchanges. 
 The process of analysis has indicated how difficult exchanges may be between 
representatives of logics rooted in different historical experiences, languages, and conceptual 
understandings. Even though both logics draw on a shared Western cultural heritage, 
misunderstandings may easily arise. 
 A few examples from the sphere of politics may suffice as illustrations of the potential 
for misunderstandings: One logic is at home in two-party systems, another in multiparty 
systems, with the former being much more open to religious rhetoric in politics than the latter. 
This has a bearing on the understandings of politics (Mutz, 2006) and journalism (Nord, 2001; 
Underwood, 2008). Moreover, the differences between conservative and liberal attitudes in one 
system cannot be transferred to cover the differences between right and left in the other. 
Crucial to our topic, “creationism” appears to be a rather prominent topic in the USA, but 
presents no serious challenge to natural science in the North European context. And while the 
differences between conservative and liberal attitudes may move along anti- versus pro-science 
lines, stances towards science do not constitute a dividing line between North European right 
and left attitudes. In addition, the German and Scandinavian terms for science—Wissenschaft 
in German, videnskab in Danish—include the humanities. 
3. THE TRADITION OF SCIENCE TRANSMISSION 
The tradition of science transmission is described here as an instance of the Anglo-American 
reporter tradition which can be placed within an Atlantic media model (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004) and has come to be widely seen as the epitome of modern journalism (Meyer & Lund, 
2008, in press). Similarly, the tradition of science transmission is probably viewed by many as 
the epitome of science journalism. 
 The reporter framework has been connected to the early twentieth century (Schudson, 
2000) and evolved in the aftermath of the American civil war on the basis of experience with 
how journalism might stir “sectional antipathies” and prepare the ground for violent conflicts 
(Cater, 1959, p. 85). The founders of the reporter tradition seem to have opted for non-
participation in human affairs as the safest bet, much as did the founding fathers of the 
academic science tradition of the early Royal Society, who were looking for firm ground in the 
aftermath of the English civil wars (Sprat, 1667/1734). Indeed, the reporter tradition appears to 
be using science as its model and is marked by a veneration of science (Altschull, 1990). 
 Generically, the reporter is defined as a producer of naked information to be transmitted 
to her social counterpart: the public as consumers of the journalistic products. The producer-
consumer relation ties the reporter to her audience, and disconnects her from it. She is 
supposed only to transmit naked observations, regarding facts and events, and to consider 
herself an outside observer of human affairs, committed to professional values of non-
participation: objectivity, neutrality and impartiality. Politically, the reporter is supposed to 
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facilitate that the people may control the holders of power. Activism, advocacy, bias, 
commentary, enthusiasm, interpretation and partisanship are to be strictly avoided. News is 
contrasted sharply with views. Reporters, it has recently been argued, must provide “the truth, 
beyond differences of opinion” (Muhlmann, 2008, pp. 6, 17). When conflicts arise, reporters 
are generally expected to provide balance. They should hear both sides of the conflict.2 
 The centerpiece of the reporter framework is the notion of universal truth which is tied 
to an ideal of unity, but also—because the notion of universal truth comes with a tendency to 
generate dichotomies (Meyer, 2012)—serves as a source of continuous ambivalence and 
tension. That again, is compounded by the fact that the reporter is anchored, at the same time, 
to the sphere of truth and to the marketplace. Accordingly, the tradition has come to comprise 
an ever-changing cluster of different schools. Some favor a “facts function,” others a “forum 
function” of the media, but the search for truth and unity is pivotal to all (Nord, 2001). 
 The fact that science functions as a model of the reporter tradition influences the 
perception of science journalism and makes it incomparable with other areas of reporting. As 
opposed to political opinions and power plays and political or religious beliefs and zeal, 
science represents knowledge of reality, the search for truth and the highest standards of 
objectivity, neutrality and impartiality. Science is, therefore, considered a righteous cause and a 
privileged journalistic subject area. The reporter should serve science, and the facts to be 
transmitted by the science reporter are already produced by scientists. 
 Scientists are contrasted sharply with non-scientists. In 1959, it was put succinctly by 
C. P. Snow, often cited in exchanges about science communication: “[T]heir attitudes are 
closer to other scientists than to non-scientists who in religion or politics or class have the same 
label as themselves” (p. 10). Snow also linked the scientific community to equality and 
democratic attitudes. 
 The purpose or mission of science journalism is to further the authority of science, to 
defend science against its enemies and to support the dissemination and implementation of 
scientific knowledge. That includes the goals of increasing the degree of science literacy in the 
public, helping individuals to get more accurate pictures of the world, inducing changes of 
behavior, and facilitating that policy decisions be based on sound science. Science should be 
communicated to the lay public of non-scientists. 
 Defining the public as non-scientists, the tradition of science transmission is based on, 
but has also developed an uneasy relationship with, the so-called deficit model of the public. 
Vis-à-vis science, the public is perceived to be lacking of knowledge and in need of science 
education. The public is a lay public, and potential consumers of science journalism. As such 
—and corresponding to an assumed dichotomy of facts versus values—it is also assumed to be 
less susceptible to intellectual than to emotional appeal. The ground is prepared, thereby, for a 
classical reporter dilemma, in that the dry transmission of scientific facts will not do. Rather, 
dramatization and fascination seem required. The point was made more than half a century 
ago: “The reader, it has been said, is the median man, destined like Orphan Annie, never to 
grow an inch. . . . It is the median man’s attention, not his intelligence that must be attracted 
and held” (Cater, 1959, p. 171). 
 To the particular field of science reporting there seems to be no way to get around the 
deficit model, but that model has in recent decades been subject to recurring criticism. It keeps 
bobbing up again, but so does the criticism (Kahlor & Stout, 2010; Zenker, 2012). Science, it 
                                                
2  The assumption that conflicts are two-sided forms part of the reporter tradition. 
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should be remembered, is linked not only to universal truths, but also to equality and 
democracy. In the context of modern knowledge societies, characterised by the spread of 
science into ever more areas of life, the model can be seen as an expression of a condescending 
attitude toward the people—the demos of democracy—and the autonomous citizen. 
Consequently, the aim of improving the public understanding of science has been 
supplemented by participatory approaches and the aim of furthering public engagement with 
science (Kahlor & Stout, 2010). 
 The scientist, within his speciality, should tell how things really are. In order to 
maintain his position as an authority and to protect the reputation of science (Meyer & Sandøe, 
2012), he should do so objectively, neutrally and impartially. The role of the scientist is the 
role of a knower. Disagreements among scientists tend be viewed as instances of scientific 
uncertainty: they disagree, it appears, because they are still looking for the true answers. Even 
when scientists are dealing with scientific uncertainties or with huge systems that exceed the 
capacity of the human brain, concerns about scientists’ possible lack of knowledge and 
understanding tend to be overruled by concerns about knowledge deficiencies in the public 
(Dahlstrom & Ritland, 2012). 
 For several reasons, however, it is far from easy for scientists to transmit their 
knowledge objectively, neutrally and impartially when they move from the scientific 
community into a wider society which is assumed to be guided by completely different norms. 
In essence, it is perceived as a move from a sphere of a quiet and dignified search for true 
answers to complicated questions into a sphere of cynical power play and ideological warfare. 
It is difficult for the scientist to transmit his knowledge and be true to the norms of science. 
Colorful language, including striking metaphors and analogies, might support attempts to 
explain complicated topics—but such usage may also be frowned upon as appeals to the 
irrational that may erode the rational quality of science. Moreover, the scientific community is 
“still not fully equipped to deal with the media” and, must learn to “play the game” and present 
coherent responses to the world (Morgan, 2012). 
 The journalist should assist in completing the task of transmission. Meticulous reading 
of scientific journals helps her choose the topics to be reported on. Ideally, she should be a 
trained scientist herself or, at least, she should have attended hands-on science courses. 
Otherwise, she might not get the science right. Inaccuracy, then, would be added to the damage 
to the science that cannot be avoided when it is reduced and simplified and packaged for 
transmission to the lay public. It is a continuous science journalistic dilemma that although the 
science journalist is committed to science, she can only transmit reduced versions. She must 
even dramatize and attempt to fascinate the lay audience. Ideally—in order to serve the cause 
of science and to serve democratic or anti-elitist causes of inclusion—science should be shown 
to be fun. Outcomes of rational inquiry must be transmitted by way of appeals to the irrational, 
supported by (rational) transmission techniques and methods. 
 More recent dilemmas relate to scientists who advocate political causes (Goodwin, 
2012; Sjölander, Carvalho, & Maeseele, 2013) or who combine their scientific activities with 
financial interests in their own individual scientific fields—behavior which can be seen as a 
threat to the authority of science as objective, neutral and impartial. Science reporters are also 
confronted with dilemmas when scientists disagree. Increasingly, however, the notion of 
scientific consensus is deployed as a means to partly dissolve those dilemmas by guiding 
journalists toward those scientific voices that represent the current majority in a more or less 
clearly defined scientific area and away from “Fringe Scientists” (Stocking, 1999). 
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3.1 The Tradition of Science Transmission: A Recent Illustration 
Recent BBC initiatives illustrate a good many aspects of the tradition of science transmission. 
The initiatives appear to have been triggered by controversies relating to the debate on climate 
change, but have much wider implications. 
 As a key part of a review of its coverage of science, the BBC Trust commissioned an 
emeritus professor of genetics (Steve Jones) to make an evaluation—published in 2011— 
which should “include not just natural sciences but also coverage of technology, medicine and 
the environment relating to the work of scientists” (BBC Trust, 2012, p. 1). The review was 
followed-up by media training for scientists; new science training workshops and seminars for 
journalists; new routines to widen contacts with scientists and new audience research—the 
overall aim being to increase “the firepower of BBC Science” (BBC Trust, 2012, p. 6). The 
Trust, moreover, has decided to partly suspend the general demand that journalism should be 
balanced. Thus, the coverage of science-related issues should instead be guided by a principle 
of “due impartiality” or “due weight”: 
On the application of due impartiality, the Trust agreed with Professor Jones that, “there should be no 
attempt to give equal weight to opinion and to evidence” and that a “false balance” (to use Professor 
Jones’ term) between well-established fact and opinion must be avoided. (BBC Trust, 2012, p. 1). 
The purpose of the principle of “due weight” is, it is emphasized, “to achieve impartiality in 
science reporting, especially in areas of very intense debate and divided opinion, such as 
climate change” (BBC Trust, 2012, p. 8). The principle is tied to the notion of scientific 
consensus. The Trust points out certain difficulties: 
The broad principle of “due weight” is, of course, easily explicable, and in practice the centre of 
gravity in some subjects can be readily identified. But in a wide range of areas (for example, badger 
culling, stem cell research, genetically modified food or nuclear energy) it is harder to delineate 
where the scientific consensus might lie. (BBC Trust, 2012, p. 8). 
Lack of willingness among scientists to participate in discussions on current affairs constitutes 
another problem. Thus, the team behind a specific program “has bid for many more potential 
panelists from the science world—but most refuse because they wish to talk about their field 
and do not want to become involved in current affairs” (BBC Trust, 2012, p. 12). 
4. THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE DISCUSSION 
It would be difficult to identify and empirically document the logic of science discussion at 
work anywhere in any resemblance of pure form. The logic originates in a tradition of publizist 
journalism that has been marginalized for decades. Moreover, the current wave of attention 
being paid to science communication has gained momentum precisely during those same 
decades. Consequently, the logic of science discussion can hardly be characterized as a 
tradition, but, rather, can be reconstructed as a logic, and traces of it can be identified in recent 
and current attitudes and practices. 
 The publizist framework of thought on journalism appears to be—or to have been— 
thriving in particular, but not exclusively, in German-speaking and Scandinavian countries. 
Correspondingly, it can be placed within a north/central European media model (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004) and is likely to be less compatible with two-party systems than with multiparty 
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systems, corresponding to a pluralist notion of society as being composed of multiple interest 
groups. Characteristically, key notions of the tradition resist direct translation into English, 
with Öffentlichkeit—the institution of public discussion—being one of several examples 
(Meyer & Lund, 2008). 
 The publizist tradition is based on a practical (as distinct from technical) approach in 
the classical sense and has probably been on the defensive since the rise of the reporter 
tradition and, even more so, since the end of the Second World War. Widely neglected in the 
field of journalism studies, it has a history of practice rather than of theory and empirical study 
(Meyer & Lund, in press). Key notions of the tradition, such as Aktualität (topicality) and 
Redigieren (editing), originate in the Latin verb for action: agere. The notion of Aktualität 
(Enzensberger, 1964) is geared towards the identification of burning issues in need of public 
scrutiny. Max Weber made a lasting contribution to the publizist framework of thought by 
linking politics to an ethics of responsibility for future action—as distinct from an ethics of 
ultimate ends, typical of religion—and describing journalism as the epitome of a political 
profession (Weber, 1919/1992, pp. 36–37, 70). 
 Rather than being defined, in the first place, as a producer, the publizist journalist is 
defined as a participant or co-citizen. She is ascribed the task of editing in an ongoing public 
discussion on public affairs which serves as a form of inquiry into the conditions for collective 
action. The journalist is expected to explore issues from many different perspectives, and to 
facilitate the expression of disagreement—the civilized exchange between different points of 
view—which is valued and seen as something that ought to be maintained (Enzensberger, 
1964; Rathgeb, 2005) and that demands moderation from all participants. Journalism includes 
independent inquiry, reporting, interpretation and critique. Truthfulness is a guiding value— 
the degree of mutual trust needed to maintain the institution of public discussion depends on 
it—and is juxtaposed to lying (Kapuściński, 2002, p. 108). 
 Increasingly, public affairs include or even hinge on results from scientific 
development. Some issues relate to the development and possible uses of new technologies. 
From a publizist perspective the uses of scientific knowledge and science-based technologies, 
and the ways such knowledge and technologies come about, are public affairs and, therefore, 
must be subjected to public discussion. Science should not simply be communicated. There is, 
rather, a need for reasonable communication about science. 
 In other cases, scientific or other varieties of academic inquiry have been made 
regarding issues of a non-technical nature, and the outcomes and assessments from such 
inquiries should be included in public discussions. Scientists should not simply communicate 
to other citizens but with them. To some extent and under certain conditions it is assumed to be 
both possible and necessary to argue with science and scientists and, in particular, to consider 
possible limitations when scientific findings are taken into the complexity of societal practice. 
Questions of what is and what is not possible to know, and in what ways (Arendt, 1998, p. 49) 
constitute a continuous subtext of exchanges relating to science. 
 The role ascribed to the public is that of the co-responsible citizenry. By definition, 
citizens have an interest in science- and technology-related issues that have bearings on public 
affairs. Most citizens, most of the time, are not really interested in science-related issues and 
only follow debates from a distance, if at all, but in most cases—according to a multiplicity of 
circumstances—some will have something to contribute to the continuous process of public 
opinion formation. Technical aspects must be explained to become accessible to non-
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specialists, but the public is definitely not composed of pupils (Die Zeit, 2012), and the quality 
of being lay is not the defining feature of the public as an audience. 
 The role most suited to scientists within the logic of science discussion is that of 
citizens with specialized knowledge or, if you like, of public intellectuals in a small way. This 
means that scientists should master the vernacular and possess knowledge about—not be 
ignorant of—the societal context of their specialised knowledge (Jacoby, 2000). Most 
scientists, most of the time, simply need to get on with their work, but now and again their 
knowledge becomes topical. They should be ready, then, to contribute to public discussion—
including civilized exchanges with possible critics of their current projects—with knowledge 
claims and personal assessments and opinions. If they do so, scientists are likely to gain trust in 
so far as they are seen to be open about scientific uncertainty and vested interests, acknowledge 
the limits of their scientific expertise and authority and do not appear to be obsessed with their 
topics and, thereby, prone to make inflated claims (Primas, 2002). 
 Scientists may make a case: participation in politics is not viewed as basically 
suspicious. The ferocity of such notions as “advocacy” and “partisanship,” however, is not 
compatible with the political institution of public discussion between multiple points of view, 
and they resist direct translation as political notions into, for example, Danish. The logic, thus, 
has plenty of room for scientific knowledge claims and for scientists’ personal assessments and 
arguments, but collapses if assessments and arguments come to be presented as impersonal 
knowledge that demands straightforward deference and aims at halting discussion. 
 The science journalist is expected to be a science journalist. She should be 
knowledgeable and competent within her field, but so should journalists who practice in other 
fields. The journalistic task remains one of facilitating public discussion between different 
points of view. Different positions should be critically inquired into, and the vested interests of 
participants and stakeholders should be pointed out. That includes the positions and interests of 
scientists. 
 The science journalist has twin tasks: demystifying and making scientific approaches, 
findings and claims accessible to non-specialists, and asking questions concerning legitimacy. 
Such questions relate to purposes, assumptions, uncertainties and social and financial interests; 
they belong to the context of societal practice. Scientists are in possession of specialised 
knowledge from specific fields. They may also be isolated, to some extent, within those fields. 
Journalists come with experience of contextualization from a variety of scientific specialities. 
The relation between scientists and journalists is not one of simple asymmetry between 
knowers (the scientists) and non-knowers (the journalists, representing a lay public). Rather, 
there is a relation of double asymmetry and, thus, there is a basis for a sort of reciprocity. The 
absence of scientific specialisation in the journalist is not a deficiency, but a journalistic merit. 
 The general publizist demands for pluralism and moderation are also expressed in 
methodical pluralism—choosing approaches on a case-to-case basis—and in appreciation of 
the open-endedness of human language. Affection for language is a feature of the tradition 
(Kapuściński, 2002, p. 112; Timms, 1986, p. 45). Metaphorical abstinence, thus, is neither 
expected of nor valued in journalists and scientists. But metaphorical moderation is. 
 Increasing scientific specialization, accompanied by an increasing risk of narrow-
mindedness in scientists, is viewed as a challenge, as is the growth of science PR, accompanied 
by the increased risks of hype—viewed as a variety of lying—and attempts to oversell 
scientific projects. The identification of current ethical challenges, as seen from within the 
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logic, however, is hampered by the fact that the logic is hard-pressed by the increasing 
adoption of notions and concepts from the tradition of science transmission. 
 For example: Scientific and technological uncertainty and how such uncertainty may be 
reasonably assessed, presented and discussed from case to case, is no doubt viewed as a major 
ethical challenge. When one thinks within the logic of science discussion, that challenge 
becomes linked to the logic’s preoccupation with limits and the limitations of science. One of 
the most urgent ethical challenges, thus, originates in knowledge questions. Along the lines of 
an assumed facts-versus-values dichotomy, however, a tendency has become dominant to 
radically separate ethical issues from knowledge questions. Consequently, attempts to face up 
to challenges as ethical-cum-knowledge questions are prevented. 
4.1. The Logic of Science Discussion: A Recent Illustration 
As mentioned earlier, concepts and notions from the tradition of science transmission have 
become dominant also in those societies and language areas that would seem to constitute a 
natural home for the logic of science discussion. Clear-cut practical examples of the logic, 
therefore, are hard to come by, but illustrations of significant traits may be found. One such 
illustration is a 2012 speech which was held by the head of the science division of Sveriges 
Radio (Swedish public service broadcaster), Ulrika Björkstén, when she received a prize for 
her work (Björkstén, 2012). 
 Björkstén used concerns about democracy as her point of departure. The combination 
of an increased significance of science in and to society, and increasing specialization in 
science, is not easily reconciled with political democracy, she argued. According to Björkstén, 
the rise of the expert society may contribute to pushing society toward “a state of stupidity,” 
and the maintenance of a democratic society depends on the maintenance of critical, competent 
and independent science journalism as a public service. Such journalism, in her view, should 
walk on two legs. It should explain and make scientific findings and claims accessible to non-
specialists. And it should inquire independently of various stakeholders, scientists included. 
Indeed, she suggested, conflicts of interest in science amount to some of the most urgent and 
difficult challenges to current science journalism. 
 The frequent references in science communication debates to C. P. Snow’s “two 
culture”’ thesis are dismissed by Björkstén. She characterizes the view of the role of science in 
society that appears in Snow’s analysis as outdated and as a part of the problems that current 
science journalism is faced with. The analysis made by Ulrich Beck, in his book on the “risk 
society,” has more to offer, she thinks. In her interpretation it offers a more ambiguous view of 
the role of science in society: Everybody depends on the expertise of many others, and all 
depend on huge and increasingly opaque technical systems. Power structures are intimately 
connected with the possession of scientific expertise. 
 Against that background, and in order to prevent democratic deficits, science should, 
according to Björkstén, be presented, inquired into and discussed openly, and should neither be 
assumed to be good nor bad by definition. Science journalists should not restrict themselves to 
transmission activities, but should, according to the case, independently analyze, for instance, 
how scientific findings have come about, what kinds of relevant criticism scientific knowledge 
claims may give rise to, and how different varieties of experts approach the same issues in 
different ways. Science journalists should be able to distinguish between more and less 
knowledgeable voices. It is not so that any argument on any subject can be considered equally 
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valid. At the same time, a healthy scepticism should be maintained with respect to the 
objectivity of experts. 
5. CONCLUSION: SHARED ETHICAL CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR 
MUTUAL LEARNING 
The two science communication logics that have been briefly suggested here can be linked to 
different frameworks of thought on journalism, and, even, to the kinds of differences between 
academic traditions that Robert K. Merton, the American sociologist, addressed more than six 
decades ago in his essay on social scientific, American mass communication research and 
European Wissenssoziologie of a humanist vein (Merton, 1968). The differences are genuine, 
and they go deep. They are related to different historical experiences. They are expressed, not 
least, in different understandings of seemingly shared concepts and in terms that resist direct 
translation. The conditions for the necessary exchanges about shared ethical challenges are, in 
other words, ripe for mutual misunderstanding, in which genuine conflict issues may be 
ignored and superficial ones exaggerated.  
 Strange things may happen when notions and concepts are taken from one cultural 
context into another without proper attention to the possible effects of the change of context. 
For instance: Translated into “public sphere,” the German and Scandinavian notion of 
Öffentlichkeit tends to morph from signifying something people do—discuss—to signifying a 
place or space. More often than not, it even becomes tied to communitarian ideals of unity, 
rather than to the exercise of civilised disagreement (Meyer & Lund, 2008). 
 The other way around, when northern Europeans adopt the American ideal of the 
journalist who controls the holders of power on behalf of the people, they may extend the 
approach to encompass scientists. Scientists, then, come to be viewed as holders of power 
rather than as representatives of truth (Meyer, 2006). Another example: In an American 
context, it has been argued, “the more people know, the less politically effective we allow them 
to be,” and “‘the political power of professionals can be retained only if it is not exercised’” 
(Goodwin, 2012, p. 159). Transferred to a northern European context, however, strong beliefs 
in impersonal knowledge may have the effect that “the more people present their personal 
opinions as impersonal knowledge, the more politically effective they are allowed to be,” or 
“the political power of professionals can be exercised only if it is disguised as non-political.” 
 The possible growth of superstitious beliefs is a shared concern of the two logics, but 
their arguments proceed along very different lines. According to the tradition of science 
transmission, superstitious beliefs may be generated if the authority of science decreases. The 
maintenance of scientific authority, therefore, is viewed as imperative. According to the logic 
of science discussion, however, superstition is given free rein if continuous, critical discussion 
about science is neglected. All that poses as science is then likely to be accepted as scientific. 
Strong beliefs in science are seen as possible generators of superstition. Critical discussion is 
viewed as imperative to prevent superstition. 
 Exchanges across logics might become fertile if the basic differences were taken into 
account and regarded by all as possibilities for seeing things in a different light. Why is it that 
one logic wants to fascinate and the other to demystify? Why is “advocacy” anathema in one 
logic, and “hype” in another? Is it so that one logic takes openness (Meyer & Sandøe, 2012) to 
mean, first and foremost, accountability, while the other logic tends to emphasize self-critical, 
intellectual reflection (Gadamer, 1993, p. 157)? Does one logic assume a basic kinship 
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between authority and trust (Hundleby, 2012), while the other may be more inclined to link 
authority to demands for deference and takes trust to be a precondition for reciprocity? 
 Both logics, it seems, are in need of adjustments and revisions if they are to be fit to 
cope with the development of knowledge societies, marked by the expansion of scientific 
approaches into ever more areas of life, by the increasing commercializaation of science and 
by the prominence of scientific and technological uncertainties in areas of relevance to public 
affairs. Do scientific approaches make sense irrespective of the subject area? It is becoming 
increasingly difficult to find scientific specialists who are independent of vested interests, so 
what can be done to deal with that problem? Increasingly, science journalists and other 
communicators are employed as PR agents by scientific institutions who want to further their 
own specific interests. Should that be considered an ethical challenge? How should scientific 
and technological uncertainties be understood, and how are such uncertainties connected to 
disagreements among scientists? 
 Representatives of different science communication logics frame current challenges 
differently and, consequently, come up with different responses. The quality of those diverse 
responses, however, could benefit from knowledge of different science communication 
idea(l)s. At the end of the day, exchanges across different understandings might even result in 
some shared responses. 
Epilogue 
In 1506, Albrecht Dürer completed the painting Christ among the Doctors. After more than 
five centuries, the painting is still likely to have an unsettling effect on most intellectuals: It is a 
symbolic representation of a confrontation between good, in the shape of Christ, and evil, in 
the shape of learned doctors with demonic features (Arasse, 2012). It is, thus, a stark reminder 
of the ambivalence towards learning and knowledge that forms part of the early history of 
modern Western thought, marked by commitment to, but also fear of, learning and knowledge. 
 The tradition of science transmission and the logic of science discussion can be seen as 
current outcomes of centuries of attempts to deal with that ambivalence. But it has not gone 
away. There is still commitment and fear; or, more moderate, there is respect and concern. The 
ambivalence, it appears, must be dealt with continuously. As long as ideas of demonic or other 
godlike traits in science are avoided, it seems a difficult, but not insurmountable task. We can 
talk it over. 
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